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IK THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAHr

1

Plaintiff-Respondent, it
V.

1

KENNETH EUGENE WYNIA,

:t

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 870113-CA

Category Mo. 2

i

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
^yBISDICTION_AND_lJATUBE_PF_EBOCEESIlJ(3
This appeal i s from a c o n v i c t i o n of four drug o f f e n s e s f
second and third degree f e l o n i e s , after a jury t r i a l in the Third
J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Court.

This Court has j u r i s d i c t i o n t o hear the

appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. § 7 8 - 2 a - 3 ( 2 ) ( e ) ( 1 9 8 7 ) .
51M^£^I«QZ^£^ES.fEESENTED^lLAP££M<

1. Was defendant denied a fair trial due to
ineffective assistance of counsel?
2.

Is the defendant entitled to reversals of his

convictions on the basis of entrapment?
3. Did the trial court err in admitting exhibits into
evidence over defendant's objection that there was a defect in
chain of custody?

Sec* 12 IRights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall
have the right to appear and defend in person
and by counsel, . . • •

yDit£fl^tal££MCfiDJS£Ublliil20
AMENDMENT VI
In a l l criminal p r o s e c u t i o n s , the accused
s h a l l enjoy the r i g h t • • . to have the
A s s i s t a n c e of counsel for h i s defense*
AMENDMENT XIV

Section 1.
INlor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property* without due
process of law; • • • .

58-37-8.

Prohibited acts—Penalties.
(1) Prohibited acts A—Penalties.
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter,
it is unlawful for any person knowingly and
intentionally:

(ii) to distribute for value or
possess with intent to distribute for
value a controlled or . . . substance;

(iv) to agree, consent, offer, or
arrange to distribute or dispense a
controlled substance for value . . . .
(b) Any person who violates Subsection
(1)(a) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in
Schedules [Schedule] I or II is, upon
conviction, guilty of a second degree felony,
•

• • •

(ii) a substance classified in
Schedules III and [or] IV, or marijuana is,
upon conviction, guilty of a third degree
felony, . . . .
76-2-303.

Entrapment.

-2

(1) It is a defense that the actor was
entrapped into committing the offense.
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement
otficer or a person directed by or acting in
co-operation with the officer induces the
commission of an offense in order to obtain
evidence of the commission for prosecution by
methods creating a substantial risk that the
offense would be committed by one not
otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct merely
affording a person an opportunity to commit
an offense does not constitute entrapment.
• • • •

(4) Upon written motion of the defendant,
the court shall hear evidence on the issue
and shall determine as a matter of fact and
law whether the defendant was entrapped to
commit the offense. D e f e n d a n t s motion shall
be made at least ten days before trial except
the court for good cause shown may permit a
later filing.
(5) Should the court determine that the
defendant was entrapped, it shall dismiss the
case with prejudice, but if the court
determines the defendant was not entrapped,
such issue may be presented by the defendant
to the jury at trial. Any order by the court
dismissing a case based on entrapment shall
be appealable by the state.

77-14-6.

Entrapment—Notice

of claim required.

Notice of claim of entrapment shall be
given by the defendant in accord with § 76-2303.
£JATEMENT_Q|:_TfiE_£&£J6
Detendant, Kenneth Eugene Wynia, was charged by
information with four counts of distribution for value, offering,
agreeing or arranging to distribute for value, or possession with
intent to distribute for value, a controlled substance, two
second degree felonies (cocaine) and two third degree felonies
(marijuana), in violation of Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8 (Supp.

-3-

1985) (amended 1986, 1987).1

Prior to trial, defendant, through

trial counsel, gave notice of intent to claim the defense of
entrapment (R. 10). On the day of trial a jury was impaneled,
but prior to evidence being presented to the jury, a hearing was
held before the trial court on defendant's claim of entrapment.
Defendant's counsel called and examined the State's primary
witnesses, undercover police officers Celeste Paquette and
Patricia Pusey, concerning their dealings with the defendant,
after which counsel submitted the entrapment issue to the trial
court, at which time the court denied defendant's motion (Tr. 3858).

After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty as charged

on all four counts (R. 45-48).

The court sentenced the defendant

to the Utah State Prison for terms of zero to five years on the
marijuana counts and terms of one to fifteen years on the cocaine
counts, ordering that the cocaine counts run consecutively to
each other and that the marijuana counts run concurrently with
the cocaine counts.

The court further ordered restitution to the

State of Utah and Metropolitan Strike Force in the amount of
$250.00 (R. 50).

Respondent accepts the statement of facts set out in
appellant's brief (App. Br. 1-5) as being an adequate general
recitation of facts, subject to the clarifications and additions
set out below in argument relative to each point.

1

The statute in effect at the time of the offenses, including
the 1985 amendments, is reproduced in Addendum 2 of appellant's
brief. It has since been amended again in 1986 and 1987.

-4-

Defendant received effective assistance of counsel.
Further, defendant has failed to establish that he was denied
effective assistance of counsel.

Specifically, he has failed to

satisfy his burden of showing either (1) that he suffered unfair
prejudice as a result of his counsel's performancef or (2) that
his lawyer did not in fact render reasonably effective assistance
of counsel.

The alleged deficiencies in counsel's performance

are explainable on the basis of trial tactics and professional
judgment, and did not prejudice his case.
Under the statute and Utah Supreme Court decisions
relevant to entrapment, defendant is not entitled to reversals of
his convictions on a theory of entrapment.

He has not shown that

the tactics used by the police fell below standards of acceptable
police conduct, or that those tactics created a substantial risk
that the offenses would be committed by one not otherwise ready
to commit them.

The police conduct merely afforded the defendant

the opportunity to commit the offenses.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting the drug exhibits into evidence over defendant's
objection.

The State laid sutficient foundation to establish

that the exhibits were in fact the drugs purchased by the
undercover officers and that in all reasonable probability the
proffered evidence had not been changed or altered.

Under

relevant decisions by the Utah Supreme Court concerning chain of
custody, the evidence was properly admitted and any claimed
defect under the facts of the instant case would go to weight and
not to admissibility.
-5-

ABSBNEIIX

DEFENDANT RECEIVED EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
Defendant contends that he was denied a fair trial
because his trial counsel was ineffective.

Specificallyf he

claims four errors to demonstrate defense counsel's alleged
deficient performance:

(1) counsel never questioned the

discrepancies in the testimony of the State's chief witnesses,
(2) counsel did not highlight for the jury the acts of the
undercover officers which, defendant asserts, constituted
entrapment, (3) counsel did not argue the applicable law and
facts before submitting the entrapment issue to the court in a
pre-trial entrapment hearing, (4) counsel failed to point out to
the jury an alleged weakness in the chain of custody once the
court had admitted the challenged exhibits into evidence.

Based

upon counsel's alleged ineffectiveness, defendant requests a new
trial.
The governing legal standards applicable to a claim of
ineffective assistance were summarized by the Utah Supreme Court
in QQ&ianna-XjL-tlQLliS# 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983):
Relying on Py£X_.XjL--Cll§Pt 1613 F.2d 278 (9th
Cir. 1980)1, and other authorities, our
recent opinion in g£a££„XjL-M3llBLQS£f Utah,
649 P.2d 56, 58 (1982), identifies the
following considerations necessary to
determine whether a conviction should be
reversed or set aside on the basis of
ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) The
burden of establishing inadequate
representation is on the defendant, and
"proof of such must be a demonstrable reality
and not a speculative matter." £iaJtjB_JU
M£Ni££l# 554 P.2d at 204. (2) A lawyer's
•6-

" l e g i t i m a t e e x e r c i s e of judgment" in the
choice of t r i a l s t r a t e g y or t a c t i c s does not
c o n s t i t u t e i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of c o u n s e l .
£iai£^*_M£Nl££l# 554 P.2d a t 205. (3) I t
must appear that any d e f i c i e n c y in the
performance of counsel was p r e j u d i c i a l .
Siai£-3U-fi3I£yllj# Utah, 56 0 P.2d 337, 339
(1977); JaiaiBlllfi-XAJMXnJBIf 24 Utah 2d 1 9 ,
2 2 , 465 P.2d 343, 345 (1970). In t h i s
c o n t e x t , prejudice means that without
c o u n s e l ' s error there was a "reasonable
l i k e l i h o o d that there would have been a
different result. . . . "
£ia±£_XjL-j£iay, 601
P.2d at 920. S i m i l a r l y , as we s t a t e d in
S±ai£_Y.t_*tellDIP££r 649 P.2d a t 58, "the
f a i l u r e of counsel to make motions or r a i s e
o b j e c t i o n s which would be f u t i l e i f raised
does not c o n s t i t u t e i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e . "
660 P.2d at 1109.
The standards enunciated by the Utah Supreme Court
parallel the standards set forth by the United States Supreme
Court in the case ot StliQkl3B3_XjL_W3shiBSi2J), 466 U.S. 668, 104
S.Ct. 2052 (1984).

In £>iii£ island # the first case decided by the

United States Supreme Court which specifically addressed actual
ineffectiveness of counsel, the Court fashioned a two component
test:
A convicted defendant's claim that counsel's
assistance was so defective as to require
reversal of a conviction or death sentence
has two components. First, the defendant
must show that counsel's performance was
deficient. This requires showing that
counsel made errors so serious that counsel
was not functioning as the "counsel"
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth
Amendment. Second, the defendant must show
that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense. This requires showing that
counsel's errors were so serious as to
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a
trial whose result is reliable. Unless a
defendant makes both showings, it cannot be
said that the conviction or death sentence
resulted from a breakdown in the adversary
process that renders the result unreliable.
104 S. Ct. at 2064.
-7-

While the Cfldlauna and SiiijcJsland standards are worded
differently, their tests are fundamentally similar.

Both cases

put the burden of proof on a defendant to prove two points.
First, a defendant must prove that his counsel's performance was
actually deficient (or inadequate); and, second, he must prove
that the deficient performance prejudiced the outcome of his
trial.
If a defendant fails to prove that defense counsel's
performance was actually deficient, the conviction must stand.
Also, if a defendant fails to prove that the outcome was
prejudiced by defense counsel's performance, the reviewing court
should not overturn the conviction.

Hence, if there is no proof

that prejudice occurred, the reviewing court need not examine
whether defense counsel's performance was actually deficient.

The gjxiglslflnd Court s p e c i f i c a l l y addressed the p o s s i b i l i t y of
deciding appeals solely on the prejudice component:
Although we have discussed the performance
component of an ineffectiveness claim prior
to the prejudice component, there is no
reason for a court deciding an ineffectiveness claim to approach the inquiry in the
same order or even to address both components
of the inquiry if the defendant makes an
insufficient showing on one. In particular,
a court need not determine whether counsel's
performance was deficient before examining
the prejudice suffered by the defendant as a
result of the alleged deficiencies. The
object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to
grade counsel's performance. If it is easier
to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the
ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which
we expect will often be so, that course
should be followed. Courts should strive to
ensure that ineffectiveness claims not become
so burdensome to defense counsel that the
entire criminal justice system suffers as a
result.
104 S. Ct. at 1069-70.
-8-

The SiiicJsland Court has accurately stated several
reasons why state courts may first examine the prejudice
component in certain cases.

Because a defendant must prove both

components of the test (deficient performance and prejudice), the
failure to prove one prohibits reversal of the conviction.

Also

valid is the Court's statement that first examining the prejudice
component will help the criminal justice system by avoiding the
negative effects of grading defense counsel1s performance.
Perhaps most important is the Court's practical statement that
first examining the prejudice component will simply be easier for
the reviewing court in many instances.

Of course, in those cases

where it is difficult to determine whether prejudice resulted,
the reviewing court would necessarily, and properly, spend
significant time deciding whether defense counsel's performance
was deficient.

However, in those cases where counsel's

performance clearly had not prejudiced the result, the reviewing
court could avoid the difficult and time-consuming process
involved in examining the sometimes multiplicitious allegations
of deficient performance.
Based upon the foregoing, this Court should reject
defendant's ineffective assistance claim for lack of prejudice.
Clearly, the alleged errors of defense counsel, even if true, are
not sufficient to have prejudiced the outcome of his trial.
Alternatively, counsel's performance was not deficient under
applicable legal standards.

-9-

A. DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO PROVE THAT
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S PERFORMANCE PREJUDICED
THE OUTCOME.
In CfldiaDJl§r t h e Utah Supreme Court d e f i n e d
in i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s

prejudice

c a s e s t o mean a d e f e n d a n t must show t h a t

w i t h o u t c o u n s e l ' s e r r o r t h e r e was a " r e a s o n a b l e l i k e l i h o o d

that

t h e r e would have been a d i f f e r e n t r e s u l t *

at

. . ."

660 P.2d

1 1 0 9 ; c i t i n g £JtaJt£_Xx_£lfly, 601 P.2d 918 (Utah 1 9 7 9 ) .

The

standard enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in
££li£JSi3Hi3 i s very s i m i l a r :
The defendant must show that there is a
reasonable probability that, but for
counsel%s unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceedings would have been different.
A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.
104 S. Ct. at 2068.
Defendant first asserts that defense counsel never
questioned the State's primary witnesses and undercover officers,
Celleste Paquette and Patricia Pusey, regarding the discrepancy
as to when the defendant allegedly gave cocaine to Pusey on
January 3.

In citing to the record in his brief, defendant fails

to point out that the discrepancy in testimony was brought out
not only by the prosecutor on direct examination of Paquette (Tr.
88) and Pusey (Tr. 132), but also highlighted by his counsel on
cross-examination of Paquette (Tr# 101) and Pusey (Tr. 142-43).
Having made the most of such discrepancy without giving the
witnesses the direct opportunity to explain it or to modify their
testimony, counsel was in a position to argue and did in fact
argue the discrepancy to the jury during his closing argument

-10-

(Tr. 188-89) . It is difficult to see what could have been
accomplished by questioning the witnesses further on the subject.
As a sub-point, defendant says that his counsel did not
note the discrepancy between the officers1 testimony as to who
first initiated the discussion regarding cocaine on January 10.
Specifically, defendant states that while Pusey said she
initiated that conversation (Tr. 146) , Paquette testified that
the defendant did (Tr* 90). On cross-examination by defense
counsel, however, Paquette admitted that it could have possibly
been Pusey who first requested cocaine from the defendant (Tr.
105)•

Defense counsel therefore adequately handled the prior

discrepancy through Paquette's concession on cross-examination,
and thereatter argued to the jury in closing that all
conversations concerning drugs were initiated by the officers
rather than by defendant (Tr. 190)•
As to defendant's argument that where entrapment is
raised as a defense, the discrepancy in testimony is particularly
important, the argument is not well taken in the instant case.
The only real discrepancy in testimony concerns the exact
location of the cocaine transfer between the defendant and Pusey
on January 3, 1986. While it may always be helpful in
undermining credibility generally to discover and emphasize any
discrepancy in testimony, as defendant's trial counsel did in his
closing argument, the discrepancy here is not particularly
germaine to the entrapment issue, which focuses on the propriety
of the officers1 conduct, as will be more fully discussed under
Point II.

The propriety of the officers' conduct does not hinge

-11-

on whether defendant passed the bundle of cocaine to Pusey in the
parking lot or after they got into the car*

The issue of who

initiated conversation concerning drugs, on the other hand, would
be germaine to the entrapment issue, but, as mentioned above,
defense counsel adequately handled Paquette's direct testimony
that defendant initiated the conversation concerning cocaine by
obtaining a concession from her on cross-examination that it
could have been Pusey who first requested the cocaine.
Defendant next contends that his counsel did not
highlight to the jury in closing argument the acts of the
officers which he claims constituted entrapment*

His counsel did

argue that the defendant was entrapped, read to the jury the
instruction concerning the defense of entrapment, and focused on
his main point, namely, that it was not the defendant but the
officers who initiated all conversations concerning drugs (Tr.
190-91).

The fact is that the defendant had a very meager case

on entrapment, as will be more fully analyzed under Point II.
There was little which his counsel could argue in good faith
based on the evidence adduced at trial.
Defendant's next point concerns the pre-trial
entrapment hearing in which, following his taking testimony from
Paquette and Pusey, defense counsel did not argue the applicable
law and facts before submitting the entrapment issue to the
court.

In determining potential prejudice in this regard, it is

first noteworthy that counsel did preserve the entrapment issue
for trial in two particulars.

First, he filed a written motion

and gave notice ot his intent to rely on the defense of

-12-

entrapment and did so at least 10 days prior to trial as required
by Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-303(4), which provides:
(4) Upon written motion of the defendant,
the court shall hear evidence on the issue
and determine as a matter of fact and law
whether the defendant was entrapped to commit
the offense. Defendant's motion shall be
made at least ten days before trial except
the court for good cause shown may permit a
later filing.
A perusal of the court file shows that defense
counsel's Motion for Defendant to Claim Entrapment as a Defense
and Notice was dated August 5, 1986, and stamped "filed" by the
Tooele County Clerk's office on August 7, 1986 (Tr. 10). The
court's minute entry of July 14, 1986 (R. 9) shows that the trial
was scheduled for August 28, 1986, which was in fact the date the
trial began.

Thus there is no question that counsel complied

with the 10-day notice requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2303(4) which is mandated by Utah Code Ann. S 77-14-6, which
states:

"Notice of a claim of entrapment shall be given by the

defendant in accord with § 76-2-303."
Secondly, a hearing was held before the court on the
motion prior, to the taking of evidence at his jury trial on
August 28, 1986 (Tr. 38-58).

At that hearing, defense counsel

called both undercover officers as witnesses and elicited
information which might bear on the issue of entrapment.

After

the court denied his motion, defense counsel stated that the main
reason he brought the entrapment motion was so that he could
raise the issue before the jury (Tr. 58). This demonstrates
counsel's knowledge of the entrapment section of the criminal
code which provides in § 76-2-303(5), in pertinent part:
-13-

". . .

but if the court determines the defendant was not entrapped, such
issue may be presented by the defendant to the jury at trial • .
• •

It is thus clear from the record that defense counsel
did a competent job in preserving the entrapment issue for trial
by giving proper notice and conducting a hearing before the court
on the entrapment issue.
The fact that defense counsel submitted the issue of
entrapment to the court without argument did not result in
prejudice to his case.

As will be discussed under Point II, the

facts of this case simply do not suggest a viable entrapment
defense based upon the applicable law.

Counsel was not

constrained to go through the motions of arguing a futile motion
before the court where defendant was clearly not entrapped as a
matter of law. £>££ £ia££_^-MallDI£LS£# 649 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah
1982), cited in Codianna v. Morris, £££££•

Even were his case a

better one for entrapment, defense counsel1s submitting the issue
to the court without argument after the two witnesses testified
would not likely have affected the outcome of the motion absent
an indication from the court that it desired clarification of the
law of entrapment before rendering a decision.

The issues were

not complicated or complex, nor was the testimony of the two
witnesses lengthy (Tr. 39-58).
Defendant's next argument is that his counsel erred in
not pointing out to the jury the weakness in the chain of custody
of the drugs after the court admitted the evidence.

As will be

discussed under Point III, below, the chain of custody was

-14-

adequately established, and there was no indication that any of
the exhibits had been tampered with or altered in any way. Still,
defense counsel did attempt to keep out the proffered evidence by
objecting to its admission before the jury on the basis of an
alleged defect in chain of custody (Tr. 85-86, 164-65, 176).
Contrary to defendant's assertion that it was defense counsel's
"duty to point out the weakness in the evidence to the jury"
(App. Br. 8 ) , it could equally be argued that his decision not to
do so was based on a legitimate exercise of judgment in order to
maintain credibility with the jury in arguing his other points.
A lawyer's "legitimate exercise of judgment
"in the choice of trial strategy or tactics
that did not produce the anticipated result
does not constitute ineffective assistance of
counsel.
£fl&UDIL3f 660 P. 2d a t 1109 c i t i n g £ia£e_X*_£?cNi£fii,

554 P. 2d 2 0 3 ,

205 (Utah 1 9 7 6 ) .
Based upon the foregoing, it is clear that defendant's
claim of prejudice is speculative at best, and that he has failed
to satisfy his burden of showing that he suffered unfair
prejudice as a result of any one or more of the alleged
deficiencies.
B. DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO PROVE DEFENSE
COUNSEL'S PERFORMANCE WAS ACTUALLY
INEFFECTIVE.
While t h e Court can d e c i d e t h i s a p p e a l s o l e l y on l a c k
of p r e j u d i c e , d e f e n d a n t h a s a l s o f a i l e d
c o u n s e l ' s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n was d e f i c i e n t .

t o prove t h a t

defense

The Utah Supreme Court

i n £fi<3iflDDfi s t a t e d t h a t proof of i n a d e q u a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n
be a d e m o n s t r a b l e r e a l i t y

and n o t a s p e c u l a t i v e m a t t e r . "
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"must
660

P.2d at 1109; citing £JtaJt£_JU_M£lLi££lr 554 P.2d at 204. The
United States Supreme Court in JSilicJSljand stated that the proper
standard for judging attorney performance is "reasonably
effective assistance."
660 P.2d at 1109.

104 S. Ct. at 2064; &££ £l£2 ££dianfl3r

The SitijcJsIan^ Court declined to create more

specific guidelines, believing the broader standard of
reasonableness, when considered with all the circumstances of a
particular case, was more appropriate. IsJ. at 2065. However,
the SilicJsLsnd court specifically stated the reviewing courts
should be highly deferential to defense counsel:
Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance
must be highly deferential. It is all too
tempting for a defendant to second-guess
counsel's assistance after conviction or
adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for
a court, examining counsel's defense after it
has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a
particular act or omission of counsel was
unreasonable. (Citation omitted.) A fair
assessment of attorney performance requires
that every etfort be made to eliminate the
distorting effects of hindsight, to
reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's
challenged conduct, and to evaluate the
conduct from counsel's perspective at the
time. Because of the difficulties inherent
in making the evaluation, a court must
indulge a strong presumption that counsel's
conduct falls within the wide range of
reasonable professional assistance.
104 S. Ct. at 1065-66.
As pointed out above, defense counsel provided
defendant with constitutionally sutficient assistance of counsel.
All alleged deficiencies have been discussed above and are
explainable on the basis of trial tactics and professional
judgment.
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In his opening statement to the jury, defense counsel
vowed to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the
law and to the best of his ability (Tr. 71). While appellate
counsel mayf in retrospectf find things in the record that might
have been done differentlyr that record reflects that the
defendant received "the skill, judgment and diligence of a
reasonably competent defense attorney."

Dyer_y* Qiisp.

613 F.2d

275, 278 (10th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
For the foregoing reasons, defendant has not met his
burden of proof in showing that defense counsel failed to render
reasonably effective assistance as required by the federal and
Utah Constitutions.

SQIBUL2
DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO HAVE HIS
CONVICTIONS REVERSED ON THE BASIS OF
ENTRAPMENT.
Defendant argues that he is entitled to reversals of
his convictions because the undercover officers entrapped him.
After a brief discussion of the law of entrapment in Utah, the
entrapment claim will be addressed as it relates to the facts of
the case.

A.

IhS-bsslisablS-Iiax

UTAH CODE ANN. S 76-2-303(1) (1978) states:
It is a defense that the actor was
entrapped into committing the offense.
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement
officer or a person directed by or acting in
co-operation with the otficer induces the
commission of an offense in order to obtain
evidence of the commission for prosecution by
methods creating a substantial risk that the
offense would be committed by one not
otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct merely
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atfording a person an opportunity to commit
an offense does not constitute entrapment.
This section is patterned atter Model Penal Code S 2.13(1), which
sets forth a purely objective test of entrapment.

£QQ State yft

laylfilr 599 P.2d 496, 502-03 (Utah 1979); Perkins and Boycef
£LiminalJba$

1171 (3d ed. 1982).

In Ijylfli, the Utah Supreme

Court provided a clear definition of the objective test:
Under the objective view of entrapment,
the focus is not on the propensities and
predisposition of the specific defendant but
on whether the police conduct revealed in the
particular case falls below standards, to
which common feelings respond, for the proper
use of governmental power. This concept
establishes entrapment on its historical
basis, the refusal to countenance a
perversion of justice by government
misconduct. The objective view provides a
solid definitive standard upon which the
defense can rest, i.e., does the conduct of
the government comport with a fair and
honorable administration of justice?
599 P.2d at 500. The objective test focuses entirely on the
conduct of the police and their helpers; matters such as the
defendant's character, his predisposition to commit the offense,
and his subjective intent are irrelevant.

Id. at 503; SJtaifi-V^

IxisJsSfiBr 72.2 P.2d 756, 758 (Utah 1986); &Xa££_X±_£Ll2BSi

692

P.2d 747, 750 n. 3 (Utah 1984); ££fiplfi_:5U_B3II.323r 153 Cal. Rptr.
459, 468, 591 P.2d 947, 956 (1979); Perkins and Boyce, .SJJPILS at
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1171.*
Notwithstanding the clear definition of the objective
test provided in Tgylpr, the Supreme Courtf in some of its recent
entrapment casesf has not always been particularly careful in
applying the objective test, seemingly reincorporating the
•predisposition" element ot the subjective test.

For example, in

State YJSpyague* 680 P.2d 404 (Utah 1984), the Court stated:
[W]e concluded that the offense was induced
by the persistent requests by [the undercover

agent], nQ±_bY-£h£-inii,ia£ix£-£n£-££2ii£-Ql
j3£f£D£ldIL£«
680 P.2d a t 406 (emphasis a d d e d ) .

In S£a£g_x.i._GlAPEj5# t h e Court

a t one p o i n t c o n c l u d e d :
T h e r e f o r e , o n l y p o l i c e conduct t h a t " e n t r a p s "
Jth2£fi«I£a^y-flBd^HilliDS_tfi-£5ffifl)ii«ill£.£XilD£
lS_££££p££kl£*
692 P.2d at 750.

These statements, which do not appear to be

consistent with either the language of S 76-2-303(1) or the
interpretation of that statute in Taylo;, are at best confusing.
Presumably, they are not intended to modify JP^ylfiX in such a way
as to create a hybrid objective/subjective test.
P.2d at 750 n. 3.

££.

Seq Cripps, 692

l3yl£Ir 599 P.2d at 504 (Hall, J.,

2 The subjective test of entrapment focuses primarily on the
defendants predisposition to commit the offense. J^ylfil, 599
P.2d at 501. Under this test, the defense of entrapment is
denied to defendants who had a preexisting criminal intent, no
matter how overreaching the law enforcement activity may have
been. State v. Pacheco, 13 Utah 2d 148, 151, 369 P.2d 494, 496
(1962); People v. Mclntire, 153 Cal. Rptr. 237, 239, 591 P.2d
527, 529 (1979).
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concurring in r e s u l t ) . 3
Therefore, i t i s important for t h i s Court t o avoid the
problems experienced by the Supreme Court in t h i s area and t o
apply the o b j e c t i v e t e s t in s t r i c t accordance with U t a h f s
entrapment s t a t u t e .

Two Supreme Court c a s e s — S t 3 t e Vjr_MaiJfclDr

713 P.2d 60 (Utah 1 9 8 6 ) , and £jtaJt£_JU_£li£]s££S, 722 P.2d a t 75859 — are e x c e l l e n t examples of the o b j e c t i v e t e s t properly
defined and a p p l i e d , as i s a recent case from the Utah Court of
Appeals, S U t C V j ..Bright* 65 Ut. Adv. Rep. 25 ( 1 9 8 7 ) .

3 A recent entrapment decision, State v. Kaufman, 52 Utah Adv.
Rep. 30, 734 P.2d 465 (1987), where the Supreme Court appears to
have again strayed from a true application of the objective test,
drew the following criticism from one legal commentator:
This case is another decision where the
Supreme Court speaks in terms of the
objective standard of entrapment but actually
applies a subjective standard. Whether the
offenses were committed because of inducement
of the undercover officer is not the
standard. The standard is whether the
conduct of the officer was such that it would
induce a person to commit an offense they
otherwise would not commit. The opinion
simply does not focus on what conduct the
otficer engaged in that was inappropriate.
The trial court1s remarks appear to be no
more than sexist gratuities and offer little
guidance as to what conduct is proper and
what is not. It is apparent from the
decisions of the Utah Supreme Court that it
is never going to deal with the objective
standard of entrapment in the way that
concept was intended to be applied. The
better approach would be for the Legislature
to repeal the entrapment statute and start
over with a sounder statement of when a
defendant should be able to claim such a
defense.
Boyce, "Supreme Court Summaries," Intermountain Commercial
Record, Feb. 27, 1987, at 36, col. 2.
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B • Pfiffindfluils.EBiijSpiDjBLi-ClaiJB
Defendant contends that he was entrapped because the
undercover officers were female, because they met the defendant
in a social setting, may have bought him drinks, had no prior
reason to suspect him of drug dealing, and because the officers
initiated the conversation about drugs.
In evaluating defendants entrapment claim, the
following language fromfftatftv. Tayloy is instructive:
Extreme pleas of desperate illness or appeals
based primarily on sympathy, pity, or close
personal friendship, or offers of inordinate
sums of money are examples, depending on an
evaluation of the circumstances in each case,
ot what might constitute prohibited police
conduct. In evaluating the course of conduct
between the government representative and the
defendant, the transactions leading up to the
offense, the interaction between the agent
and the defendant, and the response to the
inducements of the agent, are all to be
considered in judging what the effect of the
governmental agent's conduct would be on a
normal person.
Tflyl£I# 599 P.2d at 503.
An examination of the officers1 conduct as to each date
defendant sold or arranged for the sale of drugs reveals no
improper conduct on their part, no extreme pleas, no exploitation
of any close personal friendship, no high-pressure tactics, and
no unfair exploitation of the fact that they were females making
contact with the defendant in a social setting.

It is helpful to

examine the officers1 conduct separately as to each date.

Detective Paquette testified that she and Pusey went to
the Bowling Alley Lounge about 9:00 p.m. Paquette had a
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conversation with another individual named Tony.

They discussed

partying and drugs, and when Paquette said she was interested in
some good "smoke," meaning marijuana, Tony told her he could get
some marijuana at the drop of a hat (Tr. 40-41).

Tony thereafter

brought defendant over to her and introduced defendant as his
connection at which time defendant and Tony negotiated to sell
Paquette 1/4 ounce of marijuana for $30.00 (Tr. 41). Paquette
further testified that this was an average price (Tr. 49). She
also testified that she did not represent herself to be a drug
addict (Tr. 52), that she and Pusey dressed casually in levis and
a blouse so that they wouldn't stand out (Tr. 50), and that they
had a cover story to cut off any advances that might have been
made (Tr. 51). Paquette further testified that she only had to
ask for marijuana one time (Tr. 52).
As to the cocaine transaction of January 3, 1986,
detective Pusey testified that she only made one request of the
defendant (Tr. 56, 136), and that unbeknownst to Pusey, Paquette
had set up a separate purchase of marijuana from defendant (Tr.
56).

Pusey further testified that she paid $40.00 for a 1/4 gram,

of cocaine which was "a little bit high," but that it was
supposed to be good quality and that defendant was the one who
set the price (Tr. 140-41).

Finally, Pusey testified that she

offered no favors or anything other than the purchase price for
the drugs (Tr. 141). The record reflects no more than casual
social contacts between defendant and the officers.
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2. JaDiifliy«Ifl^.l5i£«

iLansaQilon

Detective Pusey testified that she and Paquette saw
defendant at the Sandbagger Lounge, that she asked him if he
could get her some "cola," or cocaine, that he arranged an
introduction to another man named Matt, and that Matt sold her
1/4 gram of cocaine for $35.00 (Tr. 137-38).
Detective Paquette testified that during the
conversation in which defendant discussed cocaine with Pusey, he
also had a conversation with Paquette concerning marijuana (Tr.
90)•

Paquette testified that after she witnessed the cocaine

transaction, defendant told her that they could go pick up the
marijuana (Tr. 92), after which she drove at defendant's
direction to a trailer court where defendant arranged for a
marijuana sale between Paquette and a woman named Sherry from
whom Paquette purchased 1/4 ounce and 1/8 ounce of marijuana for
$45.00 (Tr. 94).
Detective Pusey testified that on both dates she drank
two to three beers and that the alcohol she consumed had no
effect on her ability to recall events (Tr. 146-47) •

She also

testified that the reason that she and Paquette drank the beer
was in order to fit into their surroundings (Tr. 148). In
response to defense counsel's question as to whether they had
purchased any drinks for defendant, Pusey stated that she could
not remember, but that "sometimes we do that because they'll buy
us a beer, we'll buy them a beer" (Tr. 149). Although Pusey
could not specifically recall whether they had purchased any beer
for defendant on January 3 and January 10, 1986, she conceded
that it was "possible" (Tr. 150).
-23-

Defendant cites £i3i£_2jL_ite.UXk£l&S# 680 P.2d 40 4 (Utah
1984), in support of his claim that since the otficers first
suggested purchasing drugs from defendant and since they had no
reason to suspect that he had previously dealt drugs, he was
entrapped by the officers1 conduct.

In Konrfrelflg, however, the

undercover otficer not only first suggested the purchase of
marijuana but after two weeks had passed, he "renewed the contact
and the request, which he followed up by calling the defendant at
least five times in attempting to purchase the marijuana."
JSSJJlfesl&S 621 P.2d at 1240.

As noted abovef no such persistence

or prodding was employed in the instant case.
Defendant's reliance on State Yt__gprggyigy 680 P.2d 404
(Utah 1984) is also misplaced, for the same reasons stated above.
In SSL^2ii&i

repeated and persistent requests of the undercover

officer were used in order to induce the defendant to sell
marijuana.

None such were employed in the instant case.
Another case upon which defendant relies is £iai£_YA

EautmaUi

734 P.2d 465 (Utah 1987), a "sting" case in which an

attractive undercover officer, representing herself to be a
divorced woman supporting six children, sold items to the
defendant at his jewelry store.

The first three times she sold

jewelry, she represented to the defendant that it was her own and
was not stolen.

Thereafter when the undercover officer set up a

meeting with the defendant, defendant made overtones for a more
intimate relationship.

The defendant thereafter expressed

reluctance about becoming implicated in illegal activity when the
undercover officer openly broached the subject, and suggested
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that the officer might be setting him up.

At a later time he

lamented that the officer had not visited him while he was in the
hospital.

He also offered to loan her some money on more than

one occasion.

The trial court concluded that the officer "was

not just selling stolen merchandise, but was selling herself as
an attractive, relatively young, divorced mother of six children
who was having hard times."

Kaufmar># 734 P.2d at 468.

The Utah

Supreme Court attirmed the trial court's conclusion that under
the objective standard set out in Xaylfii, the defendant was
entrapped.
In the instant case there are no indications that the
undercover officers were "selling themselves" in order to induce
the defendant to commit the offenses.

The record is devoid of

any suggestion of romantic involvement or that close personal
friendship were ever fostered or formed.

In fact, the officers

had a "cover story" to cut off any such intentions, and no dating
or sexual advances of any kind occurred on either occasion (Tr.
57).
Defendant's attempt to equate the conduct of the
otficer in K&ufjDfln with that of Paquette and Pusey in the instant
case does not stand up to scrutiny.

He alleges that the officers

used similar tactics to "fit in" at the bowling alley, and to
induce the defendant to obtain drugs for them (App. Br. 11). Yet
in the instant case defendant arranged to sell and/or sold drugs
to each undercover officer independently the first time he ever
met them.

He did so again a week later.

officers only had to ask once.

On each occasion the

No high-pressure tactics were
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employed, there was no pre-existing relationship between themf no
appeals to friendship, sympathy, pity or the like, no offer of
inordinate sums of money, in short, nothing but the fact that
they were casual recent acquaintances who indicated a common
interest in drugs.

The fact that the officers may have first

asked about the drugs does not make this a case of entrapment.
It is well established that conduct that merely affords a person
an opportunity to commit an offense does not constitute
entrapment.

Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-303(1); gj;gte,;A^TflyIQI , 599

P.2d 496 (Utah 1979).
It should also be noted that on January 3, 1986,
Paquette1s first contact with defendant was when Tony brought
defendant over and introduced him to Paquette as his marijuana
connection.

This occurred just after Paquette asked Tony if he

could get any marijuana, and Tony told her he could get some at
the drop of a hat (Tr. 41). Thus there was no prior social
interaction between Paquette and defendant.

Defendant was

brought in by Tony as part of a business transaction for the sale
of marijuana.

This is in contrast to the situation where an

undercover officer attempts to first befriend a suspect and
slowly works up over time to requesting illegal activity "for
friendship's sake," or, for example, in order to alleviate some
kind of hardship or suffering.

S&£ Jaylfllf s^pna, and Raufpiapt

Defendant asserts as part of his entrapment claim that
"the officers were female and in all likelihood their sex
assisted in making the acquaintance of defendant and others at
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the bar" (App. Br. 10). The fact that the officers were female
is of marginal relevance under the facts of the present case.
His argument appears to be that whenever a suspect is involved in
a drug deal with someone of the opposite sex, that suspect has
been entrapped as a matter of law.

It is an attempt to bootstrap

the improper conduct of using one's sex and attractiveness to
induce illegal conduct, such as that which occurred in Kaufman*
SJJPJLfl* to the neutral conduct of the present case, where nothing
ot the sort occurred.

Heref the defendant was not improperly

induced to commit the offense, but was merely given an
opportunity to do so.
Under all the facts and circumstances of the instant
case# the otficers1 conduct, under the objective standard of
entrapment, was a proper use of government power, and comported
"with a fair and honorable administration of justice" Jjgylfii, 599
P.2d at 500.

Thus the evidence, when viewed in a light most

favorable to the trial court's decision, does not as a matter of
law leave a reasonable doubt that defendant was entrapped.
XJLJISSII,

St;?te

728 P.2d 131, 133 (Utah 1986).

THE PROSECUTOR LAID SUFFICIENT FOUNDATION AT
TRIAL FOR ADMISSION OF THE DRUGS INTO
EVIDENCE, AND THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN
ADMITTING THE EXHIBITS.
Defendant contends that the marijuana and cocaine sold
to the undercover otficers on January 3, 1986 and January 10,
1986 were admitted into evidence without proper foundation.
Specifically, he alleges a defect in chain of custody because
David Murdock, the state crime lab criminologist who accepted
-27-

custody ot a l l the e x h i b i t s from the p o l i c e o f f i c e r who obtained
them from the p o l i c e evidence l o c k e r , did not t e s t i f y ; nor did
the c r i m i n o l o g i s t s who analyzed the e x h i b i t s t e s t i f y t h a t they
obtained them d i r e c t l y from Murdock.
The governing l e g a l standards a p p l i c a b l e t o a claim of
i n s u t f i c i e n t foundation due t o a l l e g e d d e f e c t s in chain of
custody were summarized by the Utah Supreme Court in S t a t e v .
£ia&£h3SIi 680 P.2d 1036 (Utah 1984):
Before r e a l evidence can be admitted, the
t r i a l court must be convinced that the
proposed e x h i b i t i s in s u b s t a n t i a l l y the same
c o n d i t i o n when introduced i n t o evidence as i t
was when the crime was committed. Where the
evidence has passed through s e v e r a l hands,
circumstances surrounding chain of p o s s e s s i o n
are r e l e v a n t in making t h i s
assessment.
£±Si£_iU_*?3j3££Uf 28 Utah 2d 108, 498 P.2d 670
(1972); Siaifi-Y^-ClfifilS, 98 Idaho 383, 565
P.2d 576 ( 1 9 7 7 ) . S&S 3l&2 29 Am. Jur. 2d
Eyi<3fiD££r S 774 a t 846 (1967). However, the
party p r o f f e r i n g the e x h i b i t i s not required
t o e l i m i n a t e every conceivable p o s s i b i l i t y
t h a t the evidence may have been a l t e r e d .
BaugllBan_£*_£iai£, 265 Ark. 869, 582 S.W.2d 4
(1979); £i5i£-y-L-£J£Sinl£yr 18 Wash. App. 862,
57 3 P.2d 30 (1977); SJfca4£-JTjL_Bflfig£S# 109
A r i z . 196, 507 P.2d 121 ( 1 9 7 3 ) . Some
j u r i s d i c t i o n s have held t h a t where no
evidence has been offered t o suggest
tampering, proffered evidence i s admissible
i f the chain of evidence i s otherwise
adequately e s t a b l i s h e d . JLefe£a.y_Vj,_£±St£,
Wyo., 589 P.2d 1292 (1979); £Jfcfl.t£JZA_fiflXiS r
110 A r i z . 5 1 , 514 P.2d 1239 (1973); SpaiJss^^
StetSi
89 Nev. 8 4 , 506 P.2d 1260 ( 1 9 7 3 ) . A
weak l i n k in the chain and any doubt created
by i t go to the weight to be given the
evidence once the t r i a l court has e x e r c i s e d
the d i s c r e t i o n t o conclude t h a t in reasonable
p r o b a b i l i t y the proffered evidence has not
been changed in any important r e s p e c t . iiJtaJtS
XjLJZailQSi 240 Or. App. 2 8 3 , 545 P.2d 604
(1976); Sfli££_JU-Sifll£# 88 Nev. 350, 497 P.2d
902 (1972).
680 P.2d a t 1039.
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Since the handling of all four exhibits occurred in
substantially the same way, and since defendant's allegation of
defect in the chain of custody goes only to the link involving
David Murdock as to each exhibit, a detailed examination of the
handling of Exhibit 1 should suffice for purposes of tracing
chain of custody, and in placing defendant's allegation in
perspective.

Exhibit 1 was the marijuana which Paquette obtained

from defendant on January 3, 1986.

The testimony at trial

concerning Exhibit I may be summarized as follows:
Paquette received the baggie of marijuana from
defendant (Tr. 83), atter which she sealed and marked it, placed
it into an envelope which she also marked and sealed, and then
placed it into the night-deposit bin of the Salt Lake City
evidence* room (Tr. 84-85, 96). Paquette testified that once the
item was dropped into the evidence bin, it could only be
retrieved through the evidence custodian (Tr. 96-97).

Paquette

identified the envelope in court as bearing her handwriting
showing the date and time, and identified the contents (baggie)
as also bearing her handwriting showing her IBM number and date
(Tr. 84). She identified the exhibit as being the 1/4 ounce of
suspected marijuana which she purchased from defendant and Tony
on January 3, 1986 (Tr. 84). Earl Price, a police officer
assigned to Metro Narcotics charged with handling evidence in
narcotics cases, received the exhibit from the evidence custodian
of the evidence room in Salt Lake City on January 7, 1986 (Tr.
117 and 121). Price described the Salt Lake City Police
Department evidence room as a locked, secured facility controlled
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by an evidence custodian where evidence is held for purposes of
later use in court (Tr. 117). Price further described the
procedures for maintaining the security of evidence, including
depositing and withdrawing items from the evidence room (Tr. 118121)*

Price testified that when he received the exhibit from the

evidence custodian, it was sealed and unopened (Tr. 121). He
further identified markings on the exhibit which he had placed
there showing the dates and times when he came into contact with
it (Tr. 121). Price stated that he transported the exhibit from
the evidence room in Salt Lake to the state toxicology laboratory
to have it analyzed (Tr. 121). At that time he left it there, it
was sealed and unopened (Tr. 121-22).

Price gave the exhibit to

David Murdock at the lab (Tr. 126) . Murdock was €>mployed at the
State lab as a criminologist (Tr. 129). Terrance Weaver, another
state lab analyst, testified and was qualified as an expert in
the identification of controlled substances (Tr. 153). He
identified the exhibit, stating that the envelope bore the
laboratory case number, date of analysis and his initials (Tr.
155)•

He also identified the plastic baggie inside the envelope

as having his seal on it with his initials, lab case number, and
the date of which the contents were analyzed (Tr. 155)• He
testified that at the time he began his analysis, the envelope
was sealed (Tr. 158). After completing the analysis, he placed
the sample back into the plastic bag, put his seal on it, placed
the plastic bag into the envelope, placed his seal on the
envelope and placed the evidence into the evidence locker room at
the lab (Tr. 158). Weaver further described the evidence room
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facility at the state lab, which is a locked facility, and
indicated that there were established laboratory procedures for
depositing and retrieving evidence from the locker, and that he
followed such procedures with respect to the exhibit (Tr. 159).
Earl Price testified that on January 16, 1986, he retrieved the
exhibit from Weaver at the state lab, transported it back to the
evidence room and placed it into evidence (Tr. 122 and 127)*
Price also testified that as to all four exhibits, he followed
established procedures set forth by his department for handling
the exhibits (Tr. 125-26).
It is submitted that the above-described trial
testimony constitutes convincing evidence that the proposed
exhibit was in substantially the same condition when introduced
into evidence as it was when the crime was committed.

State_, v*

First, it is clear that the containers were the same
ones initially received by the officers, in that in each case
they bore the handwriting of the officers with other identifying
information such as the date of each transaction (Tr. 84: Exh. 1;
Tr. 95-96: Exh. 2; Tr. 88-89, 110-112, 133: Exh. 3; Tr. 93, 138:
Exh. 4 ) .
Thus the question becomes, since the same containers
the otficer initially received had been individually marked by
them and were identified by them in court, could the contents
somehow have been switched or altered?

In that respect it is

noteworthy that, as indicated above as to Exhibit 1, all exhibits
were sealed by the officers prior to being placed into evidence,
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were sealed when Price withdrew them from the evidence room, were
sealed when he left them at the lab, were sealed when the
toxicologists, Weaver and Smith, started their analysis, and were
resealed by them when their analysis was complete.
A claim of tampering seems particularly unlikely when
it is recognized that, in the instant case, the otficers not only
marked and identified the containers in which they initially
received the drugs (i.e. baggie, bindle), but also placed those
containers into envelopes which they also marked and identified.
Thus if David Murdock had for any reason unsealed the envelopes
and thereafter inadvertently placed the wrong samples inside and
then resealed them, the mistake would have been evident because
the containers inside the envelopes would not have had the
officers1 markings on them.
Terrance Weaver testified that the State lab
established procedures for the deposit and retrieval of evidence
from the lab's evidence locker (Tr. 159). David Murdock was a
criminologist at the state lab (Tr. 128-29).

Earl Price followed

standard procedures into delivering the exhibits into the custody
of the state lab (Tr. 125-26).

The toxicologists followed

standard procedures in their contact with the exhibits (Tr. 159,
171-72).

There is nothing in the record to suggest that the

exhibits were altered or tampered with in any way.

In order to

imagine such a scenario one must supposed that between the time
Murdock received the exhibits and the time they were placed in
evidence at the lab, he or someone else unsealed the envelopes,
removed the baggies or bindles therefore, unsealed those
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c o n t a i n e r s as w e l l * removed the substances which were o r i g i n a l l y
i n s i d e the baggies or b i n d l e s f replaced them with new m a t e r i a l s ,
sealed the c o n t a i n e r s back up f placed the c o n t a i n e r s back i n t o
the e n v e l o p e s , and r e s e a l e d the e n v e l o p e s , a l l in such a manner
as would show no s i g n s of tampering.
As mentioned in BraJ5h£tfr Siapia# the party proffering
evidence i s not required t o e l i m i n a t e every conceivable
p o s s i b i l i t y that the evidence may have been a l t e r e d .

680 P.2d a t

1039.
In Utah, there i s a presumption of r e g u l a r i t y in the
handling of evidence by p o l i c e or other p u b l i c o f f i c i a l s .

An

e x h i b i t w i l l be excluded only i f there i s a f f i r m a t i v e evidence ot
bad f a i t h or actual tampering jglaig^Yjt^Eaglg^gagJSjt^lDgA, 5 83 P.2d
7 3 , 75 (Utah 1 9 7 8 ) , c i t i n g UDiied^iaJtfi^YjL.Cofi^^sr
1303, 1306 (9th C i r . 1 9 7 7 ) .

549 F.2d

Any gaps in the chain of custody go

to the weight and not the a d m i s s i b i l i t y of the e x h i b i t s S t a t e v.
Eagle PQQfr

538 P.2d a t 7 5 .
In Sla:t£_Xx_Bia3£l)aH, 680 P.2d 1036 (Utah 1 9 8 4 ) , the

Utah Supreme Court was confronted with a similar claim of d e f e c t
in chain of custody.

The defendant disputed the c o n t i n u i t y of

chain a t the point where a sample of suspected marijuana was
mailed t o a s t a t e chemist for a n a l y s i s .

The Court r e j e c t e d h i s

c l a i m , s t a t i n g that mailing n a r c o t i c s t o a c e n t r a l laboratory
does not n e c e s s a r i l y c o n s t i t u t e a break in the chain ot custody.
The Court a l s o focused on the point that no evidence was
presented

t o suggest t h a t mailing the sample r e s u l t e d in

tampering or s u b s t i t u t i o n of e v i d e n c e ,
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glfidgfaatfr 680 P.2d at

1039.

Further, the Court stated that the fact that the sample

remained overnight in a box ready for mailing in a locked office
of a sheriff whose deputies also had access to the office went to
the weight of the evidence.

Bi3d.Sil.3Jff 680 P.2d at 1039-40.

If mailing a sample of suspected narcotics to the lab
does not necessarily constitute a break in the chain of custody,
certainly hand-delivering a sample to a criminologist at the lab,
as occurred in the instant case, should not be considered a break
in the chain.
Furthermore, here, as in Bl3&sl)3ar no evidence was
presented to suggest that the claimed defect in chain of custody
resulted in tampering or substitution.

Any claimed technical

defect under the facts of this case would go to weight and not to
admissibility.
Due to the fact that the prosecutor laid sufficient
foundation tnat the proposed exhibits were in fact the drugs
purchased by the undercover officers on January 3, 1986 and
January 10, 1986, and that in reasonable probability the
proffered evidence had not been changed or altered, the court did
not abuse its discretion in admitting the exhibits into evidence.
QQEQhUSIQS

Based upon the foregoing arguments, defendant's
convictions should be attirmed.
DATED this j ^ ^ T d a y of December, 1987.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

CREIGHTON C. HORTON II
Assistant Attorney General
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I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Respondent were mailed, postage prepaid,
to J. Franklin Allred, and Margo L. James, attorneys for
defendant, 321 South 600 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, this
/' —

day of December, 1987.
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